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I. INTRODUCTION

Patent law in the United States has been in the process of changing
in the last few years due to a series of Supreme Court cases and
congressional action. This Article gives an overview of these changes
and their implications.
In 2010 and 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court decided four landmark
patent cases, each time affirming the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit. On June 28, 2010, the Court unanimously held in Bilski v.
Kappos3 that a patent application for claims involving hedging risk in
energy markets involved non-patentable subject matter. On May 31,
2011, the Court held 8-1 in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A. 4
that induced patent infringement required knowledge, which
encompasses willful blindness, that the induced acts constituted patent
* Sue Ann Mota, Distinguished Teaching Professor, College of Business
Administration, Bowling Green State University; J.D., University of Toledo College of Law,
Order of the Coif; M.A. and B.A. in Economics, Bowling Green State University.
1. BoB DYLAN, THE TIMEs THEY ARE A-CHANGIN' (Columbia Records 1964).

2. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010); Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB
S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068-69 (2011); Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche
Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2196-97 (2011); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited P'ship,

131 S. Ct. 2338 (2011).
3. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231. See infra text accompanying notes 11-31.
4. Global Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2068-69. See infra text accompanying notes 32-74.
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infringement. On June 6, 2011, the Court held 7-2 in Board of Trustees
of the Leland Stanford Junior University v. Roche Molecular Systems,
Inc.5 that the Small Business Patent Procedures Act of 1980,6 the BayhDole Act, does not automatically vest the patent rights to federally
funded inventions in the federal contractor. On June 9 2011, the Court
held 8-0 in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership that the defense
of patent invalidity must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Also, at the time of this writing, both houses of Congress have
passed the America Invents Act, 8 which changes the American patent
system in major ways, including moving from a first to invent system,
to a first to file patent system. The Supreme Court jurisprudence and the
America Invents Act are discussed herein.
II. BILSKI v. KAPPOS9
"But times change. "10
In 2010, the Court unanimously held that a patent application, which
claimed a procedure to protect or hedge against risk in the energy
sector, was not patentable subject matter in Bilski v. Kappos." Bilski
and Rand filed a patent application in 1997 with eleven claims,
including a claim for a method for managing consumption risk of a
commodity sold by a commodity provider at a fixed cost or in other
words, a method of hedging risk in commodity trading.1 The patent
examiner rejected all eleven claims as non-patentable subject matter
because the invention merely manipulated an abstract idea and solved a
purely mathematical problem without practical application, and
5. Stanford, 131 S. Ct. at 2196-97. See infra text accompanying notes 75-126.
6. Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 201-212 (2006).
7. Microsoft, 131 S. Ct. at 2246. See infra text accompanying notes 129-149.
8. On September 16, 2011, President Barack Obama signed the Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act into law. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284
(2011). See infra notes 139-149 & accompanying text.
9. 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). See generally Kevin Emerson Collins, Bilski v. Kappos:
Everything Old is New Again, Bilski and the Ambiguity of an "UnpatentableAbstract Idea,"
15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 37 (2011); John R. Thomas, Bilksi v Kappos: Everything Old is
New Again, Statutory Subject Matter in Context: Lessons in Patent Governancefrom Bilksi
v. Kappos, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 133 (2011); Jad Mills, Note, Patentable Subject
Matter in Bilski v. Kappos, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 377 (2011); Matthew D. Iulio, Note,
Courts Left with Little Guidance Following Supreme Court's Decision in Bilski v. Kappos,
13 TuL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 285 (2010).
10. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227 (Kennedy, J., plurality).
11. Id.at3231.
12. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The eleven claims comprised U.S.
Patent Application Serial No. 08/833,892. Id.
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consequently the invention was not directed to the technological arts.' 3
On appeal, the Board of Appeals and Patent Interferences affirmed that
the application only claimed an abstract idea which could not be
patented, but the Board also ruled that the examiner should not have
relied on the technological arts test; a claim may be eligible for a patent
if "there is a transformation of physical subject matter from one state to

another."1 4
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed in
banc with five written opinions, about which Justice Kennedy stated,
"[s]tudents of patent law would be well advised to study." 5 Chief Judge
Michel stated that the real issue when an applicant seeks to claim an
abstract idea or process is what test should be used.16 Examining
Supreme Court jurisprudence, most recently in Diamond v. Diehr in
1981,17 Chief Judge Michel concluded that the machine-ortransformation test of Gottschalk v. Benson18 is the applicable test for
patent-eligible subject matter.19 Chief Judge Michel recognized that the
Supreme Court did not intend the machine-or-transformation test to be
13. Id. at 950 (citing Ex Parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257, 2006 WL 5738364 (B.P.A.I. Sept.
26, 2006).
14. Id.
15. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3224; see Joseph M. Barich, In Re Bilski - Recent Developments
in Method Claiming, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 251; Linda M. Beale, Is Bilski Likely the
Final Word on Tax Strategy Patents? Coherence Matters, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L.

110 (2009); R. David Donoghue & Michael A. Grill, In Re Bilski: A Midpoint in the Evolution
of Business Method Patents?, 7 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 316 (2009); M.J. Edwards &

Donald Steinberg, The Implications ofBilski: PatentableSubject Matter in the United States, 49
IDEA 411 (2009); Stefania Fusco, In Re Bilski: A Conversation with Judge Randall Rader and
a First Look at the BPAI's Cases, 20 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. (2010); Stefania Fusco, Article, Is
In Re Bilski a Deji vu?, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2009); Lauren Katzenellenbogen et al.,
Alternative Software Protection in View of In re Bilski, 7 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 332

(2009); Lauren Katzenellenbogen et al., Debate on In re Bilski, 7 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
260 (2009); Robert A. McFarlane & Robert G. Litts, Business Methods and PatentableSubject
Matter Following In Re Bilski: Is "Anything Under the Sun Made by Man" Really Patentable?,
26 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 35 (2010); Andrew Patrick, Patent Eligibility
and Computer-Related Processes: A Critique of In re Bilski and the Machine-orTransformation Test, 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 181 (2009); Elizabeth Ruzich, In Re Bilski and the
FutureofBusiness Method and Software Patents, 50 IDEA 103 (2009); Michael J. Shimokaji &
Philip L. Gahagan, Mind Over Matter: The Bilski Decision, Like Others Before It, Reveals How
Courts Have Frequently Kept Patent Law Lagging Behind Technology, 32 L.A. LAWYER 36
(Apr. 2009); Jeremy J. Carney, Note, Retreatfrom the Brink of Clarity: Why the FederalCircuit
Got In Re Bilski Wrong, and What Can be Done About It, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 473;
Matthew Ocksrider, Note, Patentability of Computer Software and Business Methods Post
Bilski: A New Hope, 14 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 179 (2009).

16.
17.
18.
19.

In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 952.
450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
409 U.S. 63,67 (1972).
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d. at 959.
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the sole test.2o Because Bilski's claim failed that test, the denial was
affirmed.2 1
The Supreme Court affirmed that the invention was ineligible for
patent protection and held that the machine-or-transformation test was
not the exclusive test for determining patent eligibility.22 Justice
Kennedy began with the patentable statutory subject matter: processes;
machines; manufactures; or compositions of matter. 23 In addition, the
invention must be novel,2 4 useful,25 and particularly described.26
According to the Court, the process at issue in Bilski was not patentable
subject matter, but whether the machine-or-transformation test was the
27
only test to ascertain patentable subject matter. In a portion of the
decision not joined by Justice Scalia, the Court stated that the machineor-transformation test used by the Federal Circuit may have been
sufficient in the Industrial Age, but was not necessarily enough in the
Information Age. 28
The majority joined by Justice Scalia did say that at least some
business methods may be patentable. 29 The Court elected not to set
categorical rules and left the door open for the Federal Circuit to
develop other tests or criteria consistent with the Patent Act. 30
20. Id. at 955. In addition, the courts have reviewed numerous process claims involving
several areas of technology for years, but other tests were inadequate. Id. at 958-59.
21. Id. at 966. Chief Judge Michel also reaffirmed the conclusion of State Street Bank &
Trust. Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), that business
method claims are subject to the same patent requirements as other processes or methods. Id at
960. Judge Dyk concurred by responding to the two dissenting opinions which argued that the
majority usurps the legislative role. Dyk stated that the statutory subject matter has been in place
since the Patent Act of 1793. Id. at 966 (Dyk, J., concurring). Only one dissenter, Judge
Newman, believed that the claims had "yet to be examined for patentability." Id. at 997.
22. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226 (2010) (Kennedy, J. plurality).
23. Id. at 3225 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 101). The Court also mentioned judicially created
exceptions to this subject matter: "laws of nature; physical phenomena; and abstract ideas." Id.
(quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).
24. Id. at 3229 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2002)).
25. Id. at 3229 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2004)).
26. Id. at 3229 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1975)).
27. Id. at 3226.
28. Id. at 3227.
29. Id. at 3228.
30. Id. at 3228-29. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor,
concurred in the judgment. Id. at 3231. Justice Stevens agreed with the Court that the text of the
statute was the starting point of the analysis, but not the ending point. Id. at 3236. In their view,
business methods themselves are not covered by the statute. Id. at 3252. In a concurrence by
Justice Breyer, joined in part by Justice Scalia, Breyer stated that he agreed with Justice Stevens
that business methods were not patentable processes. Id. at 3257-58 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Justice Breyer also stated that while the machine-or-transformation test was not the sole test, the
Court did not emphasize or deemphasize its use, nor did the Court state that "many patentable
processes lie beyond its reach." Id. at 3259. Thus, with another change in composition of the
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Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that the machine-or-transformation
test was not the only test and that more clarity was needed on what test
should be used. While the patent claims were denied, the issue of what
exactly a patentable process is and which test to use remains
unanswered. After Bilski, abstract patent claims apparently remain nonpatentable, but it is unclear where the line is drawn and which test is to
be used.
III. GLOBAL-TECHAPPLIANCES, INc. v.SEB S.A.

32

On May 31, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Global-Tech
Appliances v. SEB S.A., that induced patent infringement "requires
knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent infringement, and that
willful blindness can constitute this knowledge." 33
SEB, a French kitchen appliance company, 34 was the assignee of
patent number 4,995,312,35 the '312 patent, filed in the United States in
1990. Claim 1 was for an electric deep fryer that had a metal pan with a
wall, an electric heat resister that heated that wall with conductive
heating to a temperature hotter than 150 degrees.36 The pan had a nonheat-resistant plastic skirt which surrounded the wall; the skirt was
separated by an air space to insulate the plastic skirt to keep it from
melting. 37 A ring of heat-insulating material joined the top edge of the
38
skirt to the top edge of the pan.38
In 1999, SEB sued Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc.,3 9 Global-Tech
Court, business methods may be outright deemed un-patentable subject matter.
31. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office issued a memorandum, Interim Guidancefor
Determining Subject Matter Eligibility for Process Claims in View of Bilski v. Kappos,
available at
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/bilskiguidance-27jul2010.pdf (last
visited Sept. 14, 2011).
32. 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011).
33. Id. at 2069.
34. Hoover's, Inc., Hoover's In-Depth Company Records: SEB SA (June 22, 2011),
available at 2011 WLNR 12414626. SEB's subsidiary T-Fal sells its products in the United
States. Id.
35. U.S. Patent No. 4,995,312 (filed Aug. 28, 1990).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. Previous deep fryers had metal exposed to the human touch which could burn;
plastic remains cool. Initial Brief for Respondent at 2, Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB
S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, No. 10-6 (2010). To develop a heat resistant plastic would be cost
prohibitive. Id.
39. Montgomery Ward declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 1997 and emerged in 1999 as a
wholly-owned subsidiary of GE Capital. Montgomery Ward became Ward's, an online retailer.
Hoover's, Inc., Hoover's In-Depth Company Records: General Electric Co. (Sept. 7, 2011),
availableat 2011 WLNR 17663616.
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Appliances, Inc.,40 and Pentalpha Enterprises, Ltd.4 1 for direct and
induced infringement of the claims of the '312 patent.4 2 Global-Tech's
subsidiary Pentalpha, began selling the allegedly infringing deep fryers
to Sunbeam in 1997.43 In the preparation for the manufacturing of these
fryers for Sunbeam, Pentalpha purchased a deep fryer in Hong Kong
made by SEB, which did not contain a patent number and copied its
patented features.44 Without telling its attorney it had copied features in
the '312 patent, Pentalpha hired an attorney who analyzed 26 patents
and concluded that none of those claims were violated by the Pentalpha
fryer. 45 In 1998, SEB sued Sunbeam in the United States, alleging
infringement of the claims of the '312 patent, and Sunbeam settled for
$2 million.46 After Pentalpha learned of the Sunbeam suit, it also sold
the fryers to Fingerhut Corporation47 and Montgomery Ward.4 8 The
present suit ensued, and SEB was awarded a preliminary injunction in
1999, which was affirmed in 2000.49
Pentalpha redesigned the deep fryer, replacing the ring5 o with six
blocks or rings.5 1 In 2001, SEB requested and received supplemented
injunctive relief which included the modified fryer since the modified
40. Global-Tech Appliances, now known as Global-Tech Advanced Innovations, is a
Hong-Kong based home appliance and electronics company incorporated in the British Virgin
Islands. GLOBAL-TECH ADVANCED

INNOVATIONS

ANNUAL REPORT, available at global-

webpage.com (last updated Mar. 31, 2001). SEB is listed as a competitor. Hoover's, Inc.,
Hoover's In-Depth Company Records: Global-Tech Advanced Innovations, Inc. (Sept. 7, 2011),
availableat 2011 WLNR 18195053.
41. Pentalpha is a subsidiary of Global-Tech. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594
F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
42. Id. at 365.
43. Id. Sunbeam went into Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2001 and emerged as American
Household, Inc. in 2002. Sunbeam Products, a subsidiary of American Household, Inc., is a
private corporation which manufactures and markets consumer products, including medical
products such as thermometers and household and outdoor cooking products. American
Household, Inc. was subsequently acquired in January 2005 by Jarden Corporation. JARDEN
CONSUMER SOLUTIONS, About Us-History, http://www.jardencs.com/AboutUs.aspx?section=

history (last visited Sept. 30, 2011).
44. SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 594 F.3d at 1366.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. Fingerhut Corp. is a subsidiary of Fingerhut Companies, which marketed and sold
a broad range of consumer products, but became active in 1999. WORLDSCOPE, Fingerhut Co.,
Inc., Worldscope No. 317867109, Sept. 4, 2011, available at LexisNexis Academic Fingerhut
was acquired by Federated Department Stores and later, Bain Capital. Hoover's, Inc., Hoover's
In-Depth Company Records: FederatedDepartment Stores, Inc. (May 30, 2007), available at
2007 WLNR 10092255.
48. SEB, 594 F.3d at 1366.
49. Id. at 1367.
50. See supra text accompanying note 40.
51. SEB, 594 F.3d at 1367.
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fryer infringed under the doctrine of equivalents. 5 2 At trial in 2006, the
jury found willful infringement by Pentalpha involving both fryers. In
addition, the jury found induced infringement and awarded $4.65
million to SEB as a reasonable royalty.53 The district court granted, in
part, SEB's motion for enhanced damages for willful infringement of
$2,650,000, SEB's attorneys' fees of $932,123.53 and prejudgment
interest. 54 Pentalpha recuested and received an offset of $2 million for
Sunbeam's settlement. In 2008, the district court vacated the enhanced
damages and attorneys' fees, but awarded a prejudgment interest of
$1,758,763, plus daily interest. 56
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed.
The court stated, "a claim for inducement is viable even where the
patentee has not produced direct evidence that the accused infringer
Pentalpha deliberately
actually knew of the patent-in-suit ....
disregarded a known risk that SEB had a protective patent."58 Further, a
"failure to inform one's counsel of copying would be highly suggestive
of deliberate indifference in most circumstances." 59 Global-Tech's
president John C.K. Sham, now President, CEO, and Board Member for
Global-Tech Advanced Innovations, Inc., 60 testified that he was a
named inventor on 29 U.S. patents.61 Currently, he is a named inventor
on 43 U.S. patents, including patent number 5,931,081, for an electrical
deep fryer filed in 1998. Thus, according to the appeals court,
Pentalpha willfully ignored the risk that SEB had a patent on the copied
deep fryer and consequently, the jury's finding of inducement and
subsequent damages were upheld.63 Sham, however, is the only named
inventor on U.S. patent number 5,771,781 for an electrical deep fryer,
which allows the food to lay flat as it is moved in and out of hot oil by a
gear that allows for a cooler motor temperature. 64 Thus, Global-Tech
argued that their purpose was to innovate, not to infringe, resulting in an
52. Id. (citing SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 137 F. Supp. 2d 285 (S.D.N.Y.
2001)).
53. Id. at 1367-68. Sunbeam's sales accounted for $3.6 million of the jury award,
$540,000 for Fingerhut's sales, and $510,000 for Montgomery Ward's. Id. at 1368.
54. SEB, S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11346, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2008).
55. SEB, 594 F.3d at 1368. The district court's judgment ended up being $4,878,341. Id.
56. SEB, 2008 U.S. Dist LEXIS 113468, at *13.
57. SEB, 594 F.3d at 1381.
58. Id. at 1377.
59. Id.
60. Hoover's, Inc., Hoover's In-Depth Company Records: Global-Tech Advanced
Innovations, Inc. (June 22, 2011), availableat 2011 WLNR 12418834.
61. SEB, 594 F.3d at 1377.
62. U.S. Patent No. 5,931,081 (filed May 29, 1998).
63. SEB, 594 F.3d at 1378.
64. U.S. Patent No. 5,771,781 (filed July 28, 1997).
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improved deep fryer. 65
On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the majority affirmed, finding
more than sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Pentalpha believed
there was a "high probability that SEB's fryer was patented, that
Pentalpha took deliberate steps to avoid knowing that fact, and that it
therefore willfully blinded itself."66 Justice Alito, writing for the
majority, started with the text of the Patent Act, which states,
"[w]hoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as
an infringer." 67 The statute does not mention the requisite intent of the
infringer. While actual inducement requires knowledge, the Court
turned to case law preceding the Patent Act to clarify induced
infringement, which was treated as evidence of contributory
infringement.
The Court concluded that induced infringement
"requires knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent
infringement." 69
The next question is, can willful blindness constitute the requisite
knowledge? The majority examined criminal statutes and concluded
that willful blindness could also apply in civil lawsuits for induced
patent infringement. 0 The Court adopted the two basic requirements
which prevailed in the Courts of Appeals; first, that "the defendant must
subjectively believe that there is a high probability that a fact exists and
second, the defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learning that
fact." 7 1
Justice Kennedy dissented, stating that willful blindness does not
72
equate to knowledge. He argued that policy should be left to the
"political branches," and that criminal law standards have no force
under patent law. 73
Thus, willful blindness can now constitute induced patent
infringement. This means, at a minimum, that reverse engineers need to
communicate with their attorneys, even if the reverse engineered
product purchased outside the United States does not have a patent
number. The implications, however, are much broader. If a potential
infringer believes that there is a high probability of patent infringement,
instead of taking steps to avoid learning the infringement, as in this
case, by not informing legal counsel, the potential infringer must now
65. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 15-16, Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S.
Ct. 2060 (2010) (No. 10-6).
66. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2072 (2011).
67. Id. at 2065 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2010)).
68. Id. at 2068.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2069.
71. Id. at 2070.
72. Id. at 2072 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 2074. Justice Kennedy would remand. Id.
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go the extra mile to ascertain if there has been infringement. In
hindsight, perhaps Pentalpha should have supplied fryers under their
patents 5,771,781, and 5,931,081.74
IV. STANFORD UNIVERSITY v ROCHE75

"Although much in intellectualproperty law has changed in the 220
years since the first Patent Act, the basic idea that inventors have the
right to patent their inventions has not. "
If Bilski v. Kappos77 was about what patentable subject matter is,
Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University v. Roche
Molecular Systems, Inc. is about who owns the patent. According to
the majority in Stanford University v. Roche,79 the inventor owns the
rights to the invention, and the Bayh-Dole Act 80 does not automatically
give the ownership of patent rights of federally funded inventions to the
federal contractor.
Cetus, one of the first biotechnology companies, was founded in
Berkeley, California in 1971.81 The "industrial culture" at Cetus led to
the emergence of polymerase chain reaction (PCR), and Cetus
capitalized on PCR applications. Dr. Merigan of Stanford served on
Cetus's scientific advisory board83 and arranged for Dr. Holodniy, (who
came to Stanford in 1988 as a Research Fellow in the Department of
Infectious Diseases), to research and collaborate with Cetus. In 1988,
Dr. Holodniy signed a written agreement with Stanford to assign his
inventions to the University.85 In 1989, when Dr. Holodniy started
74.
75.
Ct. 2188
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See supra notes 62 & 64.
Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S.
(2011).
Id. at 2194.
130 S. Ct. 3218, 3223 (2010).
Stanford, 131 S. Ct. at 2192.
Id. at 2198.
35 U.S.C. §§ 200-12 (2000).
Timeline of Discoveries and Contributions 1887 to Present, UNIVERSITY OF

CALIFORNIA, BERKLEY, http://berkeley.edu/about/hist/timeline.shtml (last updated 2010).

82. Joe Fore, Jr. et al., The Effects of Business Practices, Licenses, and Intellectual
Property on the Development and Dissemination of the Polymerase Chain Reaction: Case
Study, http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/contentl/1/7/. PCR technology has earned about $2
billion in its various applications. Id.
83. Initial Brief for Respondent at 12-13, Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ.
v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2010) (No. 09-1159).
84. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 583
F.3d 832, 837 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
85. Id. at 837.
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visiting Cetus, he also signed a Visitor's Confidentiality Agreement
under which he agreed that he would "assign and do[es] hereby assign"
all rights, title, and interest in each of the ideas, inventions, and
improvements that he may devise "as a consequence of his work at
Cetus" to the company.8 6
In 1991, Cetus sold the rights to the diagnostic aspects of PCR to
Roche8 7 for $300 million.8 8 Roche began manufacturing HIV detection
kits using the patented technology. 89 Stanford received federal funding
for its HIV research through the National Institutes of Health. 90
Dr. Holodniy, Dr. Merigan, and Dr. Katzenstein, all of Stanford, are
the named inventors on three patents on PCR Assays for Monitoring
Antiviral Theraby and Making Therapeutic Decisions in the Treatment
of Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome. 9' A Stanford administrator
communicated and negotiated with Roche about licensing this
technology from 2000 to 2004.92 In 2005, Stanford filed an
infringement suit against Roche, alleging that Roche's HIV detection
kits infringed on claims of Stanford's patents. 93 Roche counterclaimed
that Stanford lacked standing, that Roche acquired Cetus's rights, and
that the patent claims were obvious. 94
In 2008, the district court granted Roche's motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that all asserted patent claims were invalid due
to obviousness. In 2009, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
vacated the judgment that the patent claims were invalid for
obviousness, and remanded with instructions to dismiss Stanford's
claim for lack of standing. 9 6
86. Id. (alteration in original).
87. Roche Holding AG, a Swiss company, has two divisions, diagnostics and
pharmaceuticals. Hoover's, Inc., Hoover's In-Depth Company Records: Roche Holdings AG,
(Dec. 6, 2011) (on file with author).
88. Fore et al., supra note 82. Also in 1991, Chiron Corp. merged with Cetus, a deal
estimated at $660 million. Id.
89. Stanford, 583 F.3d at 838.
90. Id. Stanford granted the federal government a "nonexclusive, nontransferable,
irrevocable, paid-up license" in 1994. In 1995, Stanford informed the federal government that it
elected to retain title to the inventions. Id.
91. See U.S. Patent No. 5,968,730 (filed June 6, 1995); U.S. Patent No. 6,503,705 (filed
Feb. 13, 2001) (the '705 Patent included a fourth inventor, Michael Kozal); U.S. Patent
No. 7,129,041 (filed Dec. 16, 2002). Stanford is the named assignee on all three patents.
92. Stanford, 583 F.3d at 838.
93. Id.
94. Id. Roche made their arguments as a counterclaim, an affirmative defense, and a
challenge to standing. Id.
95. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17114, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2008).
96. Stanford, 583 F.3d at 849. The district court's dismissal of Roche's ownership claim
was affirmed. Id. While the statute of limitations prevented Roche from claiming ownership, it
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While state law usually governs patent ownership rights, there was
an exception in this case due to the intertwined standing issue on
whether the contract language created a present or future assignment.9 7
The appeals court reviewed Dr. Holodniy's various contracts.98 His
Copyright and Patent Agreement with Stanford stated that he agreed to
assign or confirm in writing his rights, titles, and interest to Stanford.99
The Federal Circuit stated that the "agree to assign" language means
that he promised to assign in the future, while Cetus's Visitor's
Agreement said that he hereby assigned to Cetus his right, title, and
interest.100 Thus, according to the appeals court, "the chain of title to
Holodniy's rights leads to Roche leaving Stanford with defective title
to the rights of all the inventors."b"
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit also disagreed with
Stanford and the district court on whether the Bayh-Dole ActT2 negated
Holodniy's assignments to Cetus. The court held that Stanford was
entitled to claim rights after the government did not exercise its rights,
but because Dr. Holodniy had transferred his rights to Cetus, there were
no rights for Stanford to claim.' 0 3
On June 6, 2011,104 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the 7-2
majority stated that the Constitution grants to authors and inventors the
exclusive rights to their writings and discoveries. 105 Under the current
Patent Act, "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter ... may obtain a patent
therefor."l 0 6 Precedent reinforces the idea that the rights to an invention
lie with the inventor.1 07 Inventors of course may assign their rights, and
employment contracts may grant rights to the employer.' 0 8
Congress may enact legislation that requires federal contractors to
grant title to the government, and it has done so in contracts with the
Atomic Energy Commission and the National Aeronautics and Space
can raise the defense that Stanford lacked ownership.
97. Id. at 841.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 841-42.
101. Id. at 842.
102. Id. at 844.
103. Id. See generally Gregory A. Castanias, A Review of Recent Decisions of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: 2010 Patent Law Decisions of the Federal
Circuit: "The Advent of the Rader Court," 60 AM. U. L. REv. 845, 850 (2011).
104. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S.
Ct. 2188 (2011).
105. Id. at 2194 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8).
106. Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2011)).
107. Id. at 2195.
108. Id.
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Administration. 109 Stanford argued that the Bayh-Dole Act 1 o defines
ownership interest, and it gave Stanford a conditional title which could
not be assigned to Roche.
The Court stated that Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 to
promote the utilization of inventions from federally funded research, to
promote collaboration between commercial entities and not-for-profits
and to ensure that the government had sufficient rights in federally
supported inventions.112 The Bayh-Dole Act grants a hierarchy of rights
in federally funded subject inventions. Contractors may elect to retain
title to the subject invention." The government that provided the funds
receives a "nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license"
to practice the subject invention. 114 Since Stanford received NIH funds,
the Bayh-Dole Act was in effect. Stanford disclosed the invention, gave
the federal government their nonexclusive license, and elected to retain
title.'
The Supreme Court stated, however, that Bayh-Dole Act does not
expressly vest the rights in contractors or deprive the inventors title to
their subject invention.116 According to the Court, the title is not
automatically vested because, according to the Act, contractors "may
elect" to retain title." 7 Thus, the decision of the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit was affirmed.' i8
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented.11 9 Justice
Breyer would have returned the case to the appeals court for further
argument on unresolved matters.120 Justice Breyer asked "[w]hy should
109. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2182 (2006) and 51 U.S.C. § 20135(b)(1) (2006)).
110. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-12 (2000).
111. Reply Brief of Petitioner at 4, Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v.
Roche Molecular Systems, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011) (No. 09-1159).
112. Stanford, 131 S. Ct. at 2192-93 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000)).
113. Id. at 2193 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2000) ("The contractor 'must disclose each
subject invention to the relevant federal agency within a reasonable time,' and 'make a written
election within two years of disclosure' stating that if the contractor opts to retains title; and the
contractor must 'file a patent application prior to any statutory bar date."' Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C.
§§ 202(c)(1)-(3) (2000))). If the federal contractor does not elect to retain title, the government
may consider, after consultation with the contractor, to grant a request for retention of rights by
the inventor. 35 U.S.C. § 202(d) (2000).
114. Stanford, 131 S. Ct. at 2193 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4) (2000)).
115. Id. at 2193.
116. Id. at 2196.
117. Id. at 2197 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2011)).
118. Id. Justice Sotomayor concurred separately. Id. at 2199. She shared Justice Breyer's
concerns about principles of the Bayh-Dole Act, but because Stanford did not challenge the
decision in the lower courts on these principles, she believed the appropriate decision was to
affirment. Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
119. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 2200.
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the public have to pay twice for the same invention?"l 2 1 This is a valid
question. According to Justice Breyer, after examining the agreements
made by Dr. Holodniy, the Stanford agreement came first in time, and
Stanford should have the rights to the invention. 122
The ruling in Stanford University v. Roche is extremely important
for federal contractors, among many others. It is essential that all federal
contractors and other employers explicitly require employees to sign a
legally effective contract granting and assigning all of the rights to
inventions to the employer. Explicit "do hereby assign" language is
essential, not just "agrees to assign," as Stanford included in their
contract with Dr. Holodniy.12 3 Furthermore, although it would be timeconsuming for legal counsel, employees should be required to get
permission from the employer through a visitor's agreement, or any
other sort of contract, before granting any rights, title, or interest to a
third party. After this case, legal counsel should immediately revise all
existing assignments and employer contracts to comport with Stanford
University v. Roche.124
If Congress agrees with Justice Breyer that the public should not
have to pay twice for the same invention,125 then Congress could amend
the Bayh-Dole Act to explicitly vest rights exclusively in the
government, or the government and the federal contractor. If those
rights were refused, then it is the inventor who could assign the rights.
While this would be, according to Chief Justice Roberts, "truly
surprising,"l26 Congress has done so in other areas.127 According to the
Chief Justice, it would be noteworthy for Congress to supplant the
fundamental principle of patent law, which vests ownership in the
inventor. 12 But in times of enormous federal budget deficits, it is an
action Congress could take, if desired.
V. MICROSOFT

CORP. v. i4iLIMITED PARTNERSHIP'

29

On June 9, 2011, in a David versus Goliath legal battle, the Supreme
Court unanimously ruled in favor of i4i Limited Partnership, 130a
121. Id. at 2201.
122. Id. at 2203.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 2193.
125. Id. at 2201.
126. Id. at 2198.
127. Id. at 2196 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2182 (2000) & 51 U.S.C. § 20135(b)(1) (2000)).
128. Id. at 2198.
129. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
130. i4i, Inc., Company Overview, http://i4i.com/overview.htm (last visited Sept. 26,
2011). According to their website, i4i LP, which was founded in 1993, designs and develops
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Canadian firm, against Microsoft Corporation.' 3 ' In 1994, i4i applied
for a patent for a method and system for manipulating the architecture
and the content of a document separate from each other. 3 2 Patent
number 5,787,449 (the '449 patent) was issued in 1998.133 The
invention removes dependency on document encoding technology for
computer software, and a map of metacodes is stored separately,
allowing multiple views of the same content.' 34 i4i's patent claims an
improved method for editing documents containing markup languages,
which insert the tags in the text, such as XML.'
Since 2003, versions of Microsoft Word have had XML-editing
capabilities. Thus in 2007, i4i filed suit against Microsoft for willfully
infringing claims of the '449 patent.136 Microsoft defended that the
patent was invalid.137 A jury found that the patent was not invalid, that
Microsoft willfully infringed on claims of the '449 patent and awarded
$200 million in damages to i4i.' 3 8 The district court granted a
permanent injunction and awarded $40 million in enhanced damages. 139
On appeal by Microsoft, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
affirmed. 40 The appeals court held that Microsoft successfully carried
its burden of proving the validity of the patent by clear and convincing
evidence and that the jury properly found that the patent was not
invalid. 141
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the defense of patent
invalidity must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.142 Under
collaborative content solutions and technologies. Id
131. Hoover's, Inc., Hoover's In-Depth Company Records: Microsoft Corp. (Sept. 7,
2011), available at 2011 WLNR 17664898. Microsoft is the world's number one software
maker. Id. Microsoft, 131 S. Ct. at 2252. Chief Justice Roberts took no part in the decision. Id
132. U.S. Patent No. 5,778,449 (filed June 2, 1994).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. i4i LP. v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 839 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
136. Id. at 840.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 841. The injunction was stayed pending appeal, and it does not affect the copies
of Word sold, or licensed, before the injunction was to go into effect. Id. at 839.
140. Id. The injunction went into effect 60 days after the order in 2009. Id. at 864.
141. Id. at 848. See generally Audra Dial & Betsy Neal, Proving Patent Damages is
Getting Harder, But Establishing Patent Invalidity is Getting Easier - How i4i, L.P. v.
Microsoft Corp. May Change the Landscape of Patent Litigation, 12 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 119
(2011); Nicole Blondell & Christopher Norman, $240 Million Judgment Against Microsoft
Highlights the Importanceof ProceduralChoices at Trial - Is It a Win for i4i or Merely Less of
a Loss?, 18 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 177 (2010); Nicholas A. Restauri, Case Summary, i4i
Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 20 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 563 (2010).

142. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2246 (2011). Both parties were
joined by numerous amici, including the U.S. Government supporting i4i's position. Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i LP, 131 S. Ct.
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the Patent Act, a patent is presumed valid, and the party claiming
invalidity must prove that invalidity.14 3 The Federal Circuit properly
used the clear and convincing test according to the Court; although
Microsoft argued that the standard was only by the preponderance of the
evidence.144 According to Microsoft, the higher standard discouraged
innovation by shielding "bad" patents.1 45 The Court disagreed, stating
that under the common law, there was a "universal understanding that a
preponderance standard of proof was too 'dubious' a basis to deem a
patent invalid."l 46 Nothing in the Patent Act's text changed this, and if
Congress had meant a different standard to be used, the Court assumed
it would have codified the different standard.147
Justice Breyer's concurrence, joined by Justices Scalia and Alito,
reinforced that the clear and convincing standard applies to questions of
fact, not to questions of law.148 Justice Thomas concurred in the
outcome, not because Congress "codified" the common law standard,
but rather because it did not alter the common law rule. 14 9
Thus, the Supreme Court has made clear what was not explicit in the
Patent Act: that the defense of patent invalidity must be proven by clear
and convincing evidence. This burden makes it more difficult for
defendants who are being sued for infringement to prevail and may
encourage U.S. settlements in future cases.

VI. AMERICA

INVENTS ACT

"Come senators, congressmenplease heed the call. "50
Congress did heed the call from some quarters to amend the Patent
Act. The America Invents Act passed in the Senate on March 8, 2011 by
a vote of 95-5,151 and a version was passed in the House of
Representatives on June 23, 2011, by a vote of 304-117.152 At the time
of this writing, the bills have not been reconciled and have not passed to

2238 (2011) (No. 10-290).
143. 35 U.S.C.A. § 282 (West 2011).
144. Microsoft, 131 S. Ct. at 2247. Justice Sotomayor stated, "[s]quint as we may, we fail
to see the qualifications that Microsoft purports to identify in our cases." Id.
145. Id. at 2251.
146. Id. at 2246.
147. Id. at 2250.
148. Id. at 2253 (Breyer, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 1153-54 (Thomas, J., concurring).
150. DYLAN, supra note 1.
151. S. 23, 112th Cong. (2011).
152. H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. (2011).
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President Obama due to the budget impasse. 53 The America Invents
Act would change the U.S. patent system in several key ways, and
therefore, has strong supporters and opponents.
The America Invents Act would change the U.S. patent system in
several key aspects. First, the Act would move the United States from
our long-standing first-to-invent system to a first-to-file system, which
many countries already have.1 54 Second, the Act would give inventors a
one year grace period, or a prior art exception, to file a patent
application after certain disclosures of the claimed invention.' 5 ' Third,
the assignee, and not just the inventor, could sign the patent
application.156 The Director of the U.S. Patent Office, sets patent fees,
controls and uses those fees for funding.' 5 7 Perhaps not surprisingly, the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office urged the Senate to pass the America
Invents Act.
Fourth, a new post-grant review procedure would be
created and business method patents would have an automatic stay of
litigation while the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office reviews their
scope and validity.159 One would not be able to use an alleged patent
infringer's failure to obtain the advice of counsel to prove willful or
induced infringement.' 6 0
Together with other changes, versions of the America Invents Act
have been overwhelmingly passed by Congress.161 The Act, if
reconciled and signed by President Obama, will change the landscape of
U.S. patent statutory law in ways not seen for decades.

153. Ed. Note: Since the writing of this Article, the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act was
signed into law on September 16, 2011 by President Barack Obama. Press Release, The White
House Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Signs America Invents Act, Overhauling
the Patent System to Stimulate Economic Growth, and Announces New Steps to Help
Entrepreneurs Create Jobs (Sept. 16, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/09/16/president-obama-signs-america-invents-act-overhauling-patent-system-stim.
154. S. 23, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011); H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011).
155. Id.
156. S. 23, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011), H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. § 4 (2011).
157. S. 23, 112th Cong. § 9, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. § 10 (2011).
158. Press Release, U.S. Patent Office, USPTO Urges Senate to Pass America Invents Act
(Mar. 8, 2011), availableat http://www. uspto.gov/news/pr/2011/11-1 9 .jsp.
159. H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. § 18 (2011).
160. Id. § 17. See supra text accompanying notes 32-74 for the most recent U.S. Supreme
Court jurisprudence on willful blindness qualifying as induced patent infringement.
161. See S. 23, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. (2011).
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VII. CONCLUSION
"Come writers and critics who prophesize with your pen ... don't
speak too soon for the wheel's still in spin ... For the loser now will be
later to win for the times they are a-changin'."162
The Supreme Court decided four major patent cases in 2010-11: (1)
holding in Bilski v. Kappos1 63 that a patent application claiming a
procedure to hedge risk is not patentable subject matter; (2) holding in
Global-Tech Appliances v. SEBl64 that induced infringement requires
knowledge which can be shown by willful blindness, (3) holding in
Stanfordv. Roche' 65 that the inventor owns the patent until assigned and
that the Bayh-Dole Act does not vest ownership of the patent in the
federal contractor automatically, and (4) holding in Microsoft v. i4il66
that the defense of patent invalidity must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence. Further, Congress appears poised to reconcile, and
President Obama to sign, the America Invents Actl67 which would
change American patent law in many key ways, perhaps most
dramatically in moving to a first-to-file rather than a first-to-invent
system.
Additionally, at the time of this writing, the U.S. Supreme Court has
agreed to hear three patent cases in the next term. The Court granted
writ of certiorari in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc.168 on June 29, 2011. In that case, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit held, pre-Bilski, that method patent claims were
patentable subject matter 69 and the Supreme Court granted a first writ
and remanded in light of Bilski. The Federal Circuit court reconsidered
the case and came to the same conclusionl 70 post-Bilski, and the Court
again granted the writ of certiorari.17 1
The Court on June 27, 2011 agreed to hear two cases. In Caraco
PharmaceuticalLaboratories.,Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 172 the Court of
162.

DYLAN, supra note 1.

163. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230-31 (2010).
164. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011).
165. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S.
Ct. 2188, 2196-97 (2011).
166. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2338, 2245 (2011).
167. S. 23, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. (2011).
168. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010).
169. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir.
2009). See supra text accompanying notes 11-31.
170. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
2010).
171. Mayo, 130 S. Ct. at 3543.
172. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 131 S. Ct. 3057 (2011).
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Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated an injunction ordering Novo to
correct its FDA use code for its patented pharmaceutical, and reversed
the district court's grant of summary judgment for Caraco, as Caraco
did not have the statutory basis for such a suit.173 The Court also agreed
to hear Hyatt v. Kappos,174 wherein the Federal Circuit held that if a
patent applicant, on appeal from the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences, chooses to file a civil action in federal district court
instead of appealing to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the
applicant has no limit on the right to introduce new evidence, subject of
course only to the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure.175
Thus, patent law continues to change, and under the America Invents
Act, it is anticipated that the litigation will most likely escalate.

173. Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 601 F.3d 1359, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2010), cert. granted,131 S. Ct. 3057 (2011).
174. Kappos v. Hyatt, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011).
175. Hyatt v. Kappos, 625 F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

